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The middle class, not the poor, benefit from the little health care
insurance that exists in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Encouraging the
development of private health care insurance could free up more
funds for the poor.  Prepaid capitated health insurance will
encourage efficiency by health providers; deductibles and coin-
surance will have similar effects on health consumers.
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Based on a survey and analysis of health insur-  Zimbabwe, for example, where private insurance
ance in 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,  has grown rapidly since independence, has used
Vogel reached certain conclusions:  the U.S. Blue Crosc/Blue Shield model that
existed in the United States in the 1960s and
Most Ministry of Health (MOH) budget  1970s  - in which the tax system heavily
expenses in these countries (with the possible  subsidized health insurance, all kinds of medical
exception of Tanzania and Ethiopia) are skewed  risk were covered (even for frivolous purposes),
to a small, well-defined population. The well-to-  and neither the providers or consumers of health
do pay for the "best" health zare in the private  care were encouraged to restrain costs - so that
sector, out of their own pockets or through  health costs increased rapidly.  One way or
insurance policies (usually from foreign  another, all the health insurance arrangements
sources).  Vogel studied have the same perverse incentive
effects that those open-ended, cost-based retro-
Most poor people rely on the MOH budget  spective Blue Cross insurance payments had on
as an implicit or informal formn  of national health  health care providers.
insurance or on traditional healers for whose care
they mnust  pay out of pocket - paying more for  Reform of these arrangements will be
traditional healers and drugs than they might co-  politically difficult.  In countries with an implicit
pay on health insurance.  MOH spending is low  national health coverage, more equity for the
in the geographical aieas where the poor live and  poor requires that more of the MOH budget be
for the kinds of health care the poor use, so the  directed their way. One way to do this would be
poor benefit little from these informal national  to eliminate any favorable treatment government
health insurance systems.  employees receive in the health care system.
The availability of more private health insurance
The small middle class benefits most from  would similarly free more MOH resources.
health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In the  Govermments  must examine the regulatory and
private sector, employers provide health care  incentive atmosphere to be sure they are not
either directly or on contract - which is effec-  inhibiting the development of private health
tively health insurance. As government employ-  insuirance.
ees, they get preferential treatment under formal
and informal health insurance, even national  But they must also be careful that the private
health insurance.  The countries in Sub-Saharan  health insurance that does develop fosters more
Africa have not given the poor more, or more  efficient health care. Prepaid capitated health
equitable, access to formal health insurance.  insurance will encourage efficiency by health
providers; deductibles and coinsurance have
And the forms of health insurance adopted in  similar effects on health consumers.
Sub-Saharan Africa do not encourage efficiency.
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AffairsComplex. An objective of the scries is to get these fuidings out quickly, even ifpresentations are less than fully  polished.
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on  Health  Financing  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  managed  by  the  Africa
Technical Department, Population, Health, and Nutrition Division, with
financial support from NORAD and SIDA.1
I.  Introduction
In  recent  years,  there  has  been a slow-down  in  economic  activity  in  many
Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  brought  about  by severe  droughts  in the  region,
the  worldw 4.- Ae  recession  in  the  early  and  mid-1980s,  and  unfavorable  changes  in
the  te-:s  of trade  for  their  agricultural  and  mining  products. Falling  per
ceH'ca  real incomes,  a  worsening  external  debt situation,  and  widening  budget
deficits  have  been the  consequence.  As a result  of these  economic
circumstances,  Ministry  of  Health  (MOH)  budgets  have tended  to  decrease  as  a
percent  of the total  government  budget  and  even to  decline  on a real  per
capita  basis.
Within  this  context,  Ministries  of  Health  have increasingly  looked  for
ways of  mobilizing  additional  resources  in  order  to  meet the  health  needs  of
the  population. Health  insurance  is one  in a  portfolio  of options  that  are
available  to  augment  government  budgetary  resources  for  health-care  spending.
Yet, little  comparative  information  is availablt  on the  kinds  of health
insurance  that  are  presently  extant  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. The  purpose  of
this  paper is  to fill  that  gap  in  knowledge. The  next  section  of this  paper
attempts  to  define  "health  insurance".  Then,  the  three  following  sections
discuss,  respectively:  (a)  the  prevalence  of  health  insurance,  (b)  the
contribution  of  health  insurance  to  health  finance,  and (c)  the
characteristics  of the  health  insurance.  A following  section  analyzes  these
schemes  with  respect  to insurance  criteria  developed  in the  research
literature  on health  insurance. The final  section  of the  paper  summarizes
what  has  been learned  and the  conclusions  that  can  be drawn.2
II.  What  Constitutes  h,.alth  Insurance?
Health  insurance  might  be defined  in  various  ways.  For  example,  at some
level  of abstraction,  a government  health  care  system,  financed  through
general  tax  revenues  and  provided  without  charge  to the  population  could  be
considered  to  be a form  of national  health  insurance,  albeit  an implicit  or
informal  one.  Likewise,  throughout  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  many firms  provide
free  health  care to their  employees  and  to their  families,  either  in  the  form
of company-run  clinics,  or through  contracts  with  private  physicians  and
clinics. In  some  countries  (e.g.,  in Zaire),  this  kind  of coverage  is
mandated  by government.  At another  level  of abstraction,  this  too  could  be
considered  to  be 'health  insurance",  because,  in  effect,  the  employer  is
required  to  maintain  a  pool  of funds  for  health  care (analogous  to  a sinking
fund  for  the  depreciation  of physical  capital),  and,  depending  upon
elasticities  of the  demand  for  and  supply  of labor,  much  of the "premium'  may
be shifted  onto labor. In other  countries  (L.S.,  in  Zimbabwe),  employers
voluntarily  provide  company  clinics  or pay for  health  care  for  their  employees
and  their  families  through  contracts. Human  capital  theory  would  allow  this
practice  to  be considered  to  be providing  health  insurance,  particularly  for
skilled  and  not-easily-replaced  employees;  in  effect,  the  employer  is self-
insuring  against  the  loss  of skilled  labor,  particularly  where  the  skilled
labor  is  highly  specialized,  and  hence,  highly  scarce.
Table  1  provides  a typology  for  thinking  about  the  nature  of the
conceptual  problem  in defining  "health  insurance".  Health-care  risk-spreading
mechanisms  (health  insurance)  can  either  be mandated  by government,  or
government  and the  private  sector  can  offer  risk-spreading  plans  that  are
voluntary. Because  one  of the  major  objectives  of  many government  health3
insurance  arrangements  is  usually  to  pool  risk (or  to redistribute  the  paying
for  the  pooling  of risk),  participation  in government  arrangements  is  almost
always  compulsory.  As shown  in  Table  1, government  implicit  and  explicit
health  'nsurance  arrangements  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  can  be broadly
characterized  as ranging  from  (A)  free  health  care  provided  and  financed  for
all  citizens  (e.g.,  Tanzania),  or through  (B)  health  care  provided  b-
government  and financed  through  the  general  tax  fund  and through  cost  recovery
(..,  Ghana),  (C)  compulsory  Social  Security  for  the  entire  formal  labor
market  (L.L, Senegal),  (D)  a special  health  insurance  fund  for  government
employees  (e.L,,  Sudan),  (E)  a discount  at  health  care facilities  for
government  employees  (e.g.,  Ethiopia',  (F)  other  public  "insurance",  such  as
government  employees  being  entitled  zo  private  medical  care  as a fringe
benefit  (L.g.,  Kenya),  and finally  (G)  mandated  employer  coverage  of health
care for  employees  (s..g.,  Zaire). Likewise,  in the  private  sector,  one
observes  (A)  private  insurance  policies  bought  from  insurance  companies  (e.g.,
Zimbabwe),  (B)  small  local  voluntary  risk  pools (e.g.,  Rwanda),  and (C)
employers  voluntarily  providing  medical  care  directly  (e.g.,  Zambia)  or
providing  medical  care  on contract  with  private  health-care  providers  (e,&.,
Nigeria). Each  one  of these  arrangements  spreads  risk  in  varying  degrees,  and
the incidence  of the  payment  for  the  spreading  of the  risk  also  varies,
depending  upon  elasticities  of supply  and  demand  for  labor,  and the
progressivity  of the  tax  system  used  to finance  the  governmental  arrangements.
Having  considered  these  conceptual  problems,  some  operational  definitions
had to  be made.  Therefore,  for  purposes  of this  paper,  "health  insurance"  is
defined  as a  formal  pool  of funds,  held  by a third  party,  (or  by the  provider,
in the  case  of a Health  Maintenance  Organization,  which  relies  on prepayment4
by its  insurees),  that  pays  for  the  health-care  costs  of the  membership  of the
pool.  This third  party  can  be a governmental  social  security  or  other  public
insurance  fund-pool,  or any  private  fund-pool. Given  this  conservative
definition  of formal  health  insurance,  employer-proviued  health  care is  not
considered  'health  insurance" 1. Nonetheless,  it  must also  be pointed  out
that,  to  the  extent  that  these  employer  arrangements  exist,  they  do free-up
resources  for  MOH expenditures  for  the  rest  of the  population.
By way  of summary  to this  section,  and  as a general  introduction  to the
next three  sections,  we briefly  describe  Tables  2, 3,  and  4.  These  three
Tables  summarize  the  information  on the  health  insurance  schemes  that  exist  in
the  Sub-Saharan  countries  that  have  been recently  researched,  and  their
contents  will  be more fully  describe"  and  analyzed  in  each  of the following
three  sections  of the  paper. The  sources  for the  dqta in  all  three  Tables  are
listed  under  the  last  column  of  Table  4.  Table  2 is  entitled,  "Coverage  of
Health  Insurance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa". The  countries  are  listed  in
alphabetical  order. The  main  purpose  of Table  2 is to  ascertain  what  percent
of the  population  is covered  by health  insurance;  health  insurance  is divided
into  the  three  mutually  exclusive  categories  of "Social  Security",  "Other
Public  Irsurance",  and  "Private  Insurance."  The final  column  in  Table  2  shows
the  percent  of the  population  that  is insured  in  each  country.
Table  3 shows  the  contribution  of  health  insurance  to  health  finance  in
each  country. The  column  headings  show  six  sources  of health-care  financing:
in the  public  sector,  (1)  the  MOH  budget,  (2)  the  Social  Security  Budget,  (3)
1However,  some  entries  in  Tables  2, 3 and  4 do try  to give  some  estimate
of the  extent  to  which  this  arrangement  exists,  in  countries  where  data  are
available.5
Other  PublVc  Budget,  and  in the  private  secotr,  (4)  Out-of-Pocket,  (5)  Private
Insurance,  and (6)  Other  Private. The  last  three  columns  of Table  3 show,
respectively,  (1)  the  share  of out-of-pocket  in total  national  health
expenditures,  (2)  the  share  of private  insurance,  and (3)  the  share  of public
insurance.
Table  4 shows  the  characteristics  of  health  insurance  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa,  according  to: (1)  groups  covered,  (2)  type  of management,  (3)  number
and  percent  of the  total  population  enrolled,  (4)  services  covered  (inpatient,
outpatient,  preventive,  and  drugs),  (5)  unit  of enrollment,  (6)  uniform
premium,  (7)  copayment  and/or  deductible  and (8)  the  total  budget  of the
insuring  entity. The last  column  in  Table  4 contains  clarifying  comments  on
the  other  column  entries  in  Table  4, and  the  sources  for  the  data  in  Tables  2,
3, and  4.
III.  The Prevalence  of Health  Insurance
Table  2 summarizes  the  extent  of explicit,  or formal,  health  insurance
coverage  relative  to  population  size  in the  23  countries  studied. As might  be
expected,  there  is  a  wide  variation  in the  percentage  of the  population
covered. Many countries  simply  have  no formal  health  insurance  arrangements.
For  the  7 countries  with formal  health  insurance  (as  defined  above),  the
percentage  of the  total  population  insured  ranges  from  a  high of 11.4  percent
in  Kenya  to .001  percent  in Ethiopia. Thus,  an important  source  of additional
finance  is  being  neglected  and  the  relatively  poor  are  bearing  a larger  share
of the  risk  than the  rich.  Table  2 shows  that  government  employees  are  always
given  preferential  treatment  within  public  forms  of health  insurance. In
Ethiopia,  for  example,  government  employees  receive  a 50 percent  discount  at6
government  facilities,  whereas  the  rest  of the  population,  except  for  the  very
poor,  does  not receive  the  discount. As another  example  of this  kind  of
preferential  treatment,  civil  service  employees  in  Kenya  are  entitled  to
private  medical  care  as  a fringe  benefit;  this  fringe  benefit  is  paid from
funds  in the  MOH  budget,  and  cost  2.2  percent  of the  total  MOH  budget  in  1986.
G-vernment  employees  are  exempt  from  hospital  admission  charges  in  Guinea. In
Mali,  each  ministry  is  expected  to  pay  for  80 percent  of its  employees'
health-care  costs. Also,  there  is  wide  variation  in the  use  of the  Social
Security  system  as a  vehicle  for  health  insurance.
The  prevalence  of private  formal  health  insurance  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
is  extremely  small,  as evidenced  by the  low  percentage  of the  population
covered. Private  insurance  has a foothold  in  only  6  courtries:  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Swaziland  and  Zimbabwe. Even  in  Zimbabwe,  where
private  insurance  is  comparatively  well-developed,  it  only  covers  4.6  percent
of the  total  population. In  Kenya,  about  60,000  persons  are  covered  by
private  health  insurance  plans,  although  the  private  insurance  market  for
hospital  care,  at least,  seems  to  have  been preempted  by the  National  Hospital
Insurance  Fund (NHIF),  established  in  1967,  which  is  similar  to Social
Security  in  other  Sub-Saharan  countries,  and  which  covers  2.1  million  persons
in  Kenya 2. Most  private  health  insurance  schemes  seem  to  cover  the  upper-
income  classes  in the  countries  for  which  such information  is available. As
was alluded  earlier  in  this  section  and  can  be seen  in the  various  footnotes
2In  Zimbabwe,  the  National  Association  of  Medical  Aid Societies  (NAMAS),
which  is the  national  association  of  private  insurers,  estimates  that
eventually  it  will  be able to  reach  about  10  percent  of the  population  of
Zimbabwe,  i.e.,  only  about  10  percent  of the  population  can  afford  to  pay for
private  health  insurance. The  2.1  million  persons  covered  by the  compulsory
NHIF in  Kenya  is  approximately  10  perce-t  of the  population  of Kenya.7
for t&ie  countries  in  Tables  2, 3 and  4, many  private  companies  in the
countries  directly  provide  free  health  care  to their  employees  or ccntract  for
it.  In this  respect,  Lesotho  is a curious  case,  because  many of its  workers
obtain  employer  health  coverage  in  South  Africa,  ... to and  out  of which  they
migrate  for  work;  apparently  their  wives  and  children  who remain  in  Lesotho
depend  upon the  government  of Lesotho  for  health  care.
Finally,  in studying  the  contents  of  Table  2,  particularly  for  a country
like  Kenya,  one  wonders  how  many resources  could  be freed  for  the  use  of the
poor,  if  expanded  insurance  coverage  were  provided  to any  more groups. In
Kenya,  at least,  there  already  appears  to  be fairly  widespread  insurance
coverage  of the  middle  and  upper  classes,  such  that  it  would  seem  to  be
politically  possible  to  devote  more  MOH  resources  to the  poor.  However,  the
Kenyan  health-care  system  remains  urban  and  hospital  intensive,  even though
the  large  majority  of the  population  lives  in rural  areas.
IV.  The  Contribution  of Insurance  to Health  Finance
Table  3 shows  the  contribution  of  health  insurance  to health-care
finance. Total  recurrent  expenditures  are  divided  between  the  public  and
private  sector,  and  between  public  arwS  private  insurance  sources;  out-of-
pocket  expenditures  are  also included. However,  the  definition  of out-of-
pocket  expenditures  does  pose some  conceptual  difficulties,  depending  upon
whether  the  patient  goes  to a  modern  or traditional  healer. For  example,  some
governments  practice  cost  recovery. If a  person  goes to  a government  health-
care  facility,  he/she  may pay  for  20  percent  of the  cost  of the  care.  This is
clearly  an out-of-pocket  payment. If the  same  person  goes  to a traditional
healer,  and  the  cost  of the  treatment  there  is  only  one-fifth  that  in  a8
government  facility  and the  person  pays 100  percent  of this  cost,  he/she  has
paid the  same  total  amount  as at the  government  facility. The  basic  problem
here is  directly  related  to the  definition  of total  health  expenditures  in  a
country. The truth  of the  matter  is that  estimates  or  expenditures  for
traditional  care  vary  widely  from  country  to country  'Vogel  1989a)  an"  from
analyst  to  analyst 3. These  traditional  health  expenditure  estimates  make  up
part  of the  "total"  for  each  country  in  Vogel (1989a),  but they  appear
unreliable. To the  extent  that  they ."r.not  be used in the  base for  health-
insurance  ratio  comparisons,  the  percent  of  health  expenditures  that  is
insured  becomes  distorted. For  the  share  (ratio)  comparisons  in the  last
three  columns  of  Table  3, traditional  health  care  expenditures  are  excluded
from  both the  category  "out-of-pocket"  and  from  the  base,  simply  because  they
appear  to  be too  variable  and  unreliable  (Brunet-Jailly,  1988).
Estimates  on tie  percentage  share  of out-of-pocket  expenditures,
including  user fees  and  private  expenditures,  in the  total  range  from  7.3  and
7.4  percent  in  Malawi  and  Mozambique,  respectively,  to i0 1  and 72.1  percent
in  Uganda  and  Mali 4. Part  of this  variability  may  be due  to imprecision  in
the  measurement  of the  total-expenditure  base  of the  ratio. Although  every
effort  was  made to include  only  those  foreign  aid  expenditures  in the  total
that  were clearly  for  recurrent  expenditures,  some  investment  expenditures  may
have slipped  into  the  estimates  in  the  reportt  for  each  country  that  were used
as sources.
3As  an example,  see  the  discussion  in  Brunet-Jailly  (1988).
'These  estimates  come from  the  source  documents  listed  in the  last  column
in  Table  4.9
Ono  pattern  that  seems  to emerge  with  respect  to  out-of-pocket  costs  is
that in  countries  where  there  are large  mining  and  enterprise  interests,  such
as in  Swaziland,  Zaire,  Zambia  and  Zimbabwe,  the  percentages  of out-of-pocket
expenditures  (at  least  for  fo=al  care)  seem  to  be lower  than  in countries
where  such  activity  does  tlot  exist. What  makes  all  of these  estimates
difficult  though  is  the  paucity  and  unreliability  of the  existing  data  on
expenditures  upon  traditional  care.  For  example,  the  out-of-pocket  share  for
Burkina  Faso,  an extremely  poor  country,  is  25.4  percent  and  it is 29.9
percent  in  Guinea,  which  seem  to  be low  relative  to the  56.9  percent  in the
Cote d'Ivoire. However,  these  percentages  may simply  reflect  the  fact  that
the  Cote  d'Ivoire  has  been a relatively  large  iLporter  of  pharmaceuticals  (see
Vogel  1989a)  for  which  people  willingly  pay  cash  at the  many  private
pharmacios  located  around  the  country,  but  principally  in the  more affluent
ci_ies. Because  of a lower  per  capita  economic-  base and  lower  rate  of
economic  growth,  people  in Burkina  Faso  and in  Guinea  do  not  have the
pharmaceuticals  available  for  purchase,  and therefore  turn  to tradittonal
healers;  these  people  may  be spending  as high  a share  out-of-pocket,  or  even
higher,  than  the  people  in the  Cote  d'Ivoire,  but this  will  not  be reflected
in the  kind  of data  in  Table  3.
The share  of  private  insurance  in the  total  ranges  from  zero  _  16  of the
23  countries  to 15.0  and  16.5  percent  in  Senegal  and  Zimbabwe. The estimate
on private  insurance  expenditures  in Zimbabwe  is  fairly  firm,  because  the
National  Association  of  Medical  Aid Societies  (NAMAS,  the  approximate
equivalent  of the  Blue  Cross/Blue  Shield  Association  in the  U.S.)  keeps  good
statistics.  The large  share  of private  insurance  for  Senegal  (15  percent)  may
simply  be an artifact  of the  large  expatriate  community  (mostly  French)  living10
in Senegal 5. The  expatr'dtes  are  usually  insured  by sources  outside  of
Sentegal,  such  as the  French  Prevoyance  Sociale,  that  pay  expatriate  health
care  bills  in  Senegal. As a  case in  point,  the  private  Hopital  Principal  in
Dakar  is totally  supported  by insurance  payments  and  out-of-pocket
expenditures  by its  clientele  which  is  largely  expatriate. The  annual  budget
of the  Hopital  Principal  is about  one-third  the  size  of the  Senegalese  MOH
budget.
The interpretation  of the  share  of formal  public  insurance  in the  total
ii  also  subject  to some  ambiguity. For  example,  in  Burundi  (16.4  percent),
public  insurance  is  dominated  by the  Mutuelle  de la  Fonction  Publique  which  is
for  civil  servants. On the  other  hand,  Table  3 shows  no public  health
insurance  in  Nigeria,  yet some  30  million  (out  of a total  population  of some
103  million)  government  employees  and their  families  receive  free  health  care
from  government  facilities.  Likewise,  in  Zambia  public  insurance  finances
24.1  percent  of recurrent  health  expenditure.  This figure  results  from  the
fact  that  the  parastatal,  Zambiar.  Consolidated  Copper  Mines  (ZCCM)  has
established  a formal  health  insurance  pool  for  the  employees  of the
association.
V.  The  Characteristics  of the  Health  Insurance
Table  4 presents  the  characteristics  of the  health  insurance  that  is
presently  available  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. It shows  type  of management,
services  covered,  and  whether  there  are  deductibles  and/or  coinsurance. Table
4 somewhat  relaxes  the  definition  of health  insurance  that  has  been  previously
5One  estimate  puts the  number  of expatriates  at about  30,000.11
used  in this  paper,  in  order  to  give  an idea  of the  variety  of the  types  of
"health  insurance"  coverage  arrangement  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. For  example,
in Nigeria,  five  large  parastatals  provide  extremely  comprehensive  care  for
their  employees  and their  families,  either  through  their  own  health-care
facilities  or through  contracts,  and  the  2,751  registered  private  employers
(out  of a total  of 8,794  registered  employers),  who  responded  to a  Ministry  of
Health  questionnaire,  provided  similar  combinations  of coverage  for  their
employees  and families  (Nigeria,  Federal  Ministry  of Health,  1988). The  chief
complaint  from  those  employers  who  provided  care  for  their  employees  either
directly  or on contract  was the  cost  of the  health  care  provided;  it  averaged
about  6 percent  of payroll  for  those  employers  who responded  to the
questionnaire.  Also,  many  of the  employers,  who  used  contracts,  thought  that
many  of their  employees  were  abusing  their  health-care  privileges  by too-
frequent  use.  In  general,  these  Nigerian  plans  cover  all  kinds  of treatment,
inpatient,  outpatient,  and  drugs.
In  Kenya,  an estimated  2.1  million  employees  and their  families
participate  in the  National  Hospital  Insurance  Fund (NHIF)  that  was
established  in  an Act  of 1967. Persons  with a taxable  income  of Ksh  1,000  or
more  per  month  are  required  to  contribute  20 shillings  a month  to the  Fund.
This  20-shilling  amount  has  remained  constant  since  1967,  with  the  result
that,  while  only  40,000  persons  qualified  in 1967,  inflation  in  wages  and
salaries  had  driven  the  number  to  90,000  by 1988. Benefits  include  a fixed
daily  payment  to the  hospital  of Ksh  200  with an  upper  limit  of 180  days  per
year.  There  is  no deductible,  and  the  sole  "copayment"  consists  of  paying  the
difference  between  the  maximum  Ksh  200  per  hospital  day  and  any  more expensive
hospital  care that  is  chosen. Only inpatient  care  is covered. In addition,12
public  employees  have  a fringe  benefit  whereby  2.2  percent  of the  total  MOH
recurrent  budget  is  used  to subsidize  their  use  of  private  medical  care;  this
fringe  benefit  covers  inpatient,  outpatient  and  drug  care. There  is  no
deductible,  but there  is  a coinsurance  provision  where  the  government  employee
pays  a coinsurance  rate  that  varies  inversely  with the  employee's  government
grade  level. Finally,  about  60,000  employees  and  their  families  benefit  from
group  health  insurance  policies,  the  benefits  and  premiums  of which  vary  by
company. All  of these  private  plans  have  set  annual  limits  to  the  claims  that
they  will  pay  for  the individual,  and these  private  health  insurance  benefits
are in  addition  to those  obtained  under  the  NHIF,  which  is reported  to  have
led  to too  frequent  and  frivolous  use  of covered  in-patient  services.
The  kind  of private  health  insurance  that  exists  in  Zimbabwe  is of some
interest  because  it  very  closely  approximates  the  old  Blue  Cross/Blue  Shield
model  of health  insurance  that  prevailed  in the  U.S. during  the  1960s  and
1970s,  with  all  of the  consequent  perverse  efficiency  effects  that  the  model
had  on both the  consumers  and  producers  of health  care  in the  U.S.  Prior  to
the 1980s,  Blue  Cross/Blue  Shield  offered  almost  complete  coverage  of  hospital
care  and  generous  physician  reimbursement.  Because  of its  service-benefit
payment  method,  which  was  essentially  cost-based,  and  paid  retrospectively,
and  because  of low  deductibles  and  coinsurance,  neither  consumers  nor
providers  had  any incentive  to economize  in the  consumption  and  production  of
medical  care.  Moreover,  just  as in  the  U.S.,  employer  contributions  are  100
percent  deductible  under  the  enterprise  income  tax  laws  in  Zimbabwe,  and,
until  recently,  100  percent  of the  employee  contribution  was also  deductible
under  the  individual  income  tax  law  there,  thus  contributing,  at the  margin,
to the  "overpurchasel  of health  insurance,  and  then  to the  "overpurchase"  of13
medical  care,  driven  by the  insurance 6. By "overpurchase"  economists  refer  to
any incentives  that  are  offered  by government  or  by any  other  entity  that
would  induce  consumers  to  buy  more  of anything,  at the  margin,  than  personal
economic  prudence  and  personal  unsubsidized  budgets  would  allow. The  National
Association  of  Medical  Aid Societies  (NAMAS),  which  is the  national
association  for  the  non-profit  medical  aid  societies  (the  analogs  of the
individual  Blue  Cross/Blue  Shield  plans  in the  U.S.)  estimates  that  it  had
enrolled  about  384,000  employees  and  their  families  by 1987,  which  was  about
4.6  percent  of the  total  population  of Zimbabwe. The total  enrollment  was
224,000  employees  in 1981  at independence,  which  indicates  that  the  medical
aid  societies  that  are  members  of NAMAS  have enjoyed  rapid  growth  in their
enrollees. Perhaps  the  major  reason  for  this  rapid  growth  is that  the
premiums  charged  (even  apart  from  the  tax  deductibility)  do not represent  the
true  cost  of care,  particularly  in  government  hospitals  and  in the  large  and
sophisticated  government-owned  Parirenyatwa  tertiary  hospital,  where  NAMAS
enrollees  enjoy  a large  subsidy  which  is the  difference  between  what it  costs
the  hospital  to provide  a day  of care  and  what  NAMAS  member  insurers  pay.  For
example,  only 3.5  percent  of NAMAS  expenditures  went to government  (MOH)
1In  the  U.S. a great  deal  of analysis  and  empirical  work  has  been done  on
the  consequences  and  costs  of this  health  insurance  provision  in the  U.S. tax
law.  For  a summary  of this  work,  see  Pauly  (1986). With the  reform  of the
Zimbabwean  individual  income  tax law  itl  1988,  now only  20 percent  of the
premium  can  be deducted  by individuals  on their  income-tax  forms.14
hospitals  in 19877. The  largest  percentage,  48.6  percent,  went to private
physicians  and  dentists  with  whom  NAMAS  negotiates  fee  schedules,  and  which
presumably  does  reflect  the  true  marginal  cost  of private  physician  and  dental
practice. NAMAS  estimates  that  its  maximum  market  penetration  in  Zimbabwe
would  ultimately  be about  10-11  percent  of the  total  population,  given  the
lower  income  of the  other  90  percent  of the  population.  The  premiums  that
NAMAS  member  societies  charge  employers/employees  vary  with the  income  of the
employee,  so that  some  intra-plan  cross  subsidization  among  employees  does
take  place. NAMAS  plans  do not  use  deductibles,  but  a copayment  is  required
for  the  purchase  of  drugs.
VI.  Analysis  of  the  Major  Issues  in  Health  Insurance  and  Lessons  to  be
Learned
Tables  1-4  reveal  the  diversity  of  the  health  insurance  arrangements  that
exist  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. These  arrangements  are  both  explicit  (formal)
and implicit  (informal),  according  to the  typology  contained  in  Table  1.  One
can  use  at least  five  criteria  for  evaluating  these  different  forms  of  health
insurance. These  criteria  are :  (1)  who  benefits  from  them;  (2)  the
incentives  for  efficiency  that  are  built  into  them;  (3)  the  equity  of the
financing  mechanisms;  (4)  their  ease  of administration;  and (5)  their
political  acceptability.
TPrivate  hospitals/nursing  homes  received  15.3  percent  of total  NAMAS
expenditure. The  small  percentage  going  to government  hospitals  can  be
attributed  to (a)  below  marginal-cost  prices  in the  government  hospitals,
particularly  at Parirenyatwa,  and (b)  inefficient  billing  on the  part  of the
hospitals. For  example,  Parirenyatwa  is  months  behind  in its  billing  because
of an unworkable  arrangement  that  it  has  with the  government  central  computing
office  in  Harare.15
(1)  BenaeficiLari.  In the  prototypical  case  of the  Sub-Saharan
countries,  the  majority  of the  population  is informally  insured  by the
Ministry  of Health,  with free  care  financed  through  the  general  tax fund,  and
if there  is  cost  recovery,  everyone  but the  poor  pays some  deductible  and/or
coinsurance. However,  the  distribution  of  health  care  facilities  and  MOH
health  expenditures  is such  that  the  poor  do not  even  receive  a  proportional
share  of the  health  care.  This  situation  can  be changed  by redistributing  the
given  budget  for  health  expenditures  towards  the  poor.  If such  a direct
redistributive  policy  is  not  politically  possible,  then  government  must  resort
to indirect  means  of redistribution.  One  way of  doing  this  is to  mandate
formal  health  insurance  for  those  in the  formal  labor  market  either  through
(a)  requiring  the  employer  to  provide  health  care  for  his/her  employees,  or
(b)  requiring  the  employer  to  provide  health  insurance  (both  (a)  and (b)  being
implicit  taxes  on labor),  or (c)  requiring  the  employer  and the  employee  to
contribute  to a  health  insurance  fund (the  incidence  of this  implicit  tax  will
depend  upon  elasticities  of demand  for  and  supply  of labor). The  proceeds
from implicit  taxes  (a),  or (b),  or (c)  then  augment  the  total  resources
available  for  health  care  expenditures,  and  a greater  percentage  of the  MOH
budget  can then  be spent  upon the  poor.
Another  strategy  would  be for  the  government  to  create  a formal  national
health  insurance  for  the  formal  labor  market,  financed  by an explicit  payroll
tax. Again  total  resources  for  health  expenditures  are  increased,  and  a
greater  percentage  of the  MOH  budget  can  be spent  upon  the  poor;  the incidence
of the  explicit  tax  depends  upon the  elasticity  of demand  for  and  supply  of
labor.  With  either  arrangement  of financing,  total  demand  for  health  care
will  have increased,  and,  depending  upon  medical-care  supply  elasticities,  the16
price  per  unit  of  medical  care  should  increase. How large  the  new  subsidy  for
medical  care  for  the  poor  should  be can  only  be a value  judgement,  unless  the
decision  is  based  upon  a cost-benefit  analysis. The  basic  economic  argument
for  the  subsidy  is that  there  are  externalities  in thd  consumption  of  medical
care  by the  poor 8, and  that  employers/employees  in the  formal  labor  market  are
willing  to  bear the  implicit  or explicit  taxes  rather  than  having  the  pre-
existing  MOH  budget  redistributed,  in  order  that  more  care  go to the  poor.
The  primary  beneficiaries  of the  implicit  (informal)  kinds  of national
health  insurance  that  exist  in the  sixteen  countries  where  there  is  no formal
health  insurance  seem  to  be government  employees. In  most  cases,  they  receive
some  kind of preferential  treatment  over  the  rest  of the  citizenry,  either  in
the  form  of not  having  to  pay  any  cost-recovery  fees  or in  getting  some  kind
of discount,  at least  for  hospital  and  physician  services,  but  even for  drugs
in some  cases  (_.g.L,  Ghana). Likewise,  because  most  government  employees  tend
to live  in or  near  major  cities,  where  most  of the  health-care  facilities  are
located,  their  time-costs  for  obtaining  care  would  be lower. In the  countries
where  there  is formal  health  insurance,  government  employees  again  seem to
receive  much  more favorable  treatment  than  the  rest  of the  population  (e.g.,
the  government-employee  fringe  benefit  in  Kenya). In  most  countries  with
employer-provided  health  care  or "insurance*,  the  employees  in the  formal
labor  market  benefit,  and to the  extent  that  the  demand  for  skilled  labor  is
relatively  inelastic,  the  employer  probably  bears  the  major  burden  of the
aThese  externalities  in  the  consumption  of medical  care  arise  when
society  makes  a collective  judgement  that  the  poor  do  not  have enough  medical
care,  because  the  poor cannot  afford  to  pay for  the  medical  care.  Therefore
society  as a  whole  benefits  from  transfering  resources  to the  poor in  order  to
enable  them  to consume  more  medical  care.17
"taxo  for  this  coverage  and/or  insurance.  As a case in  point,  the  employees
of Zambia  Consolidated  Copper  Mines  (ZCCH)  constitute  only  6.1  percent  of the
total  population  of Zambla,  but  24.1  percent  of the  country's  total  health
expenditures  are spent  for  them. In none  of these  countries,  perhaps  with the
exception  of Tanzania  (see  Vogel,  1987)  or Ethiopia,  where  the  two  governments
have  made  strong  efforts  to provide  care  in rural  areas,  de those  in  the  non-
formal  labor  sector  seem  to  benefit  from  either  non-formal  or formal  health
insurance,  both because  they  are  either  not covered  or because  they  live  in
areas  of the  country  where the  government  spends  very  little  on health  care.
Also, it  should  be noted  that  public  insurance  efforts  can  compete  with
or even  replace  private  insurance  for  some  groups,  which  may  not  be a
desirable  outcome. There  are  ways in  which  private  insurers  can  be encouraged
by government  policy  (L.g.,  by reinsurance  or  by stop-loss  provisions;  see
Vogel,  1989b),  wlthout  the  government  becoming  a  provider  of health  insurance.
Employer-provLded  care  at least  lessens  the  financial  burden  on the  public
sector,  for  an insurable  group  that  is  willing  to  pay.
(2)  Incentives  for  Efficiency. Considerations  about  efficiency  center
upon  efficiency  in the  consumption  of  medical  care  and  efficiency  in its
production. Efficientcy  ln  consumption  refers  to  having  an incentive  structure
that induces  persons  to consume  health  care  in  an economically  prudent  manner
(j1 .. , the  absence  of Ofrivolous consumption).  Efficiency  in  production
refers  to  havlng  an incentive  structure  that  induces  providers  to take  into
account  the  economic  costs  of the  treatment  that  they  render. Efficiency  in
consumption  can  be encouraged  by the  insuzance  coverage  giving  the  correct
insurance  price  signals  to  consumers. If only  hospital  care  is covered  by the
insurance,  and  out-of-pocket  payment  must  be made for  outpatient  care,18
hospltal  care  wlll  be overconsumed  at the  margin. Likewise,  the insurance
benefit  strActure  should  be such  that  it gives  strong  incentives  to  use  the
referral  system. The insured  should  also  have insurance  price  incentives  to
seek  out less  costly  forms  of  health  care  and  not to  overutilize  the  health
care.  Deductibles  and  coinsurance  (related  to income,  if  administratively
possible)  are  usually  used  for  this  purpose.
Perhaps,  more important  than  efficiency  in  consumption  is  efficiency  in
production. Fuchs (1982)  shows  that,  although  the  patient-consumer  initiates
the  health-care  encounter  by deciding  to  go for  health  care  and  to  what  kind
of provider,  the  provider  then  begins  a chain  of treatment  decisions  for  the
patient  that  can  have  large  cost  implications.  If the  lnsurance  mechanism
reimburses  the  provider  in  such  a  manner  that  the  provider  bears  no financial
rLsk,  then  the  provider  will  behave  differently  than if  he/she  is  placed  at
financial  risk  for the  treatment  declsions  taken. Pre-paid  capitated  forms  of
insurance  reimbursement  are  usually  seen  as the  vehicle  that  is most  conducive
to shifting  financial  risk  to the  provider  of treatment.
Because  most  of the  health  insurance  reimbursement  in  Table  3 is an open-
ended  cost-based  type (e.g.,  ZLmbabwe),  or represents  transfers  from  ministry
to  ministry  (L..j,  Mali),  the  producers  of the  health  care  are  at no financial
risk,  and therefore  have no incentive  to  be efficient. Consumers  of health
care  face  low  deductibles  and  coinsurance,  or none (e.g.,  Zimbabwe  or
Nigeria),  and  they  too  have  no financial  incentive  to exercise  ordinary
economic  prudence  in  the  consumption  of medical  care.  Even  when there  is
insurance,  decuctibles/copayments  of some type  are  a desirable  feature  to
prevent  moral  hazard. Insurance,  therefore,  does  not  replace  a user-fee
system;  there  should  always  be some  form  of deductible/copayments.19
(3)  Eguitable  Financing. Given  that  the  objective  of the  formal  health
insurance  initiative  is  to  pool  risk  for  everyone  and to  cover  the
externalities  in the  consumption  of  medical  care  by the  poor (ie., that
society  as a  whole  benefits  when the  poor  have  more  access  to medical  care,
without  having  to pay  for  it),  it  would  always  be preferable,  on equity
grounds,  to finance  the  increase  in  total  resources  for  the  OH  with a
progressive  income  tax,  rather  than  with the  implicit  or explicit  payroll
taxes  outlined  in (1)  above. Payroll  taxes,  particularly  those  with an  upper
limit  on the  base of the  tax  rate,  are  regressive  to 'ncome. In the  cases  in
(1)  above  however,  the  poor  are  not  required  to  pay the  implicit  or explicit
taxes  unless  they  participate  in  the  formal  labor  market,  so that  the  implicit
and  explicit  taxes  in (1)  above  are  not as regressive  to the  income  of the
different  income  classes  as would  be implicit  or explicit  payroll  taxes  that
would  be applicable  to  all income  classes. With respect  to  equity  in the
financing  of additional  health  services  for  the  poor in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  we
can  assume  that  a  progre  sive  income  surtax  earmarked  for  health  care  cannot
be enacted  for  the  same  political  reasons  as  why the  preexisting  MOH  budget
cannot  be reallocated  more toward  the  poor.
The contents  of  Tables  2, 3  and  4 reveal  that  much  of the  informal  and
formal  insurance  is  provided  by government  to  upper  and  middle-income
government  employees. The tax  systems  used  to finance  this  insurance  are,  at
best,  proportional,  and  in  many  cases,  regressive  to income. Therefore,  in
general,  these  governmental  health  insurance  systems  can  be judged  to  be
regressive  to income,  both in  who  benefits  from  them  and  in  who  pays the  taxes
to finance  them. Many  of the  private  employer  schemes  appear  to  be
proportional  or progressive  to income,  to the  extent  that  the  employer  bears20
the  incidence  of the  "tax"  (premium)  in tight  labor  markets  for  skilled
personnel.
(4)  AdMinistrative  Aspects. Because  the  major  policy  goals  of
introducing  health  insurance  into  Sub-Saharan  Africa  dre to  mobilize  more
resources  for  health  care  for  the  poor  and  to create  incentives  for  greater
allocational  and internal  efficiency  within  the  health  care  system,  a major
design  imperative  for  this  health  insurance  is  that  it  be one that  can  be
administered  as easily  and inexpensively  as possible. Otherwise,  for  a given
amount  of additional  MOH  expenditures  for  the  poor,  the  implicit  or explicit
taxes  that  will  have to  be levied  on the  formal  labor  market  will  have to  be
higher,  thus  creating  additional  dead-weight  losses  to the  economy  from  the
implicit  or explicit  tax  system  used to finance  the  additional,  unnecessary
administrative  costs.
There  is little  empirical  evidence  on the  administrative  costs  of  health
insurance  in the  Sub-Sahara. The  costs  of  administration  of the  Prevoyance
Sociale  in  Mali may  approach  as much  as 50 percent  of revenues  (Vogel,  1988),
but  MAMAS  in Zimbabwe  indicates  that  its  member  Medical  Aid Societies'
administrative  costs  are 3robably  less  than  10  percent  of revenues. There  are
many  practical  problems  to  be solved  in  designing  health  insurance  that  is
financially  sustainable,  including  actuarial  data  on the  costs  of care  and the
-Amounts  of services  that  will  be d  uanded (Borch,  1990).
(5)  Political  Accegtability.  Finally,  the  design  of the  formal  health
insurance  should  take  into  account  its  probable  political  acceptability  by
employee-consumers,  employers,  providers,  and  government. If those
employees/employers  who  are taxed  (either  implicity  or explicitly)  do not
believo  that  they  benefit  from  the  health  insurance,  or do not  believe  that21
the  consequent  freed-up  funds  in the  MOH  budget  are  used  efficiently  and
effecltvely  upon the  poor,  there  will  be taxpayer resistance  and  non-
compliance,  over  and  above  that  which  would  have  occurred  with a  well-designed
formal  health  care insurance.  Likewise  if  the  provlders  of health  care
believe  that  they  are  not  treated  fairly  and  reasonably  in the  transfer  of
financLal  risk,  they  will not  respond  to the  incentives  offered  by the  health
insurance  in  an optimal  fashion.  Assuming  that  the  formal  health  insurance
is designed  at the  Ministry  of Health,  it  will  not  become  a  reallty  and
function  smoothly  for  its  redistributive  and  efficiency  objectives,  if it  does
not  find  approval  at the  Mlnistry  of Finance,  in the  Parliament  and  at the
Presidential  leiel.
VII.  Summary  and  Conclusions
This  paper  has attempted  a survey  and  analysis  of  health  insurance  in 23
Sub-Saharan  countries. Perhaps  the  most  useful  way to approach  the  subject  of
health  insurance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is to think  about  it as a  phenomenon  of
income  class  and income  distribution.  Put  clearly  and  simply,  the  larger
percentage  of MOH  budgetary  expenditures  in these  countries  (with  the  possible
exception  of Tanzanla  and  Ethiopia)  is  skewed  towards  a  well-defined  smaller
population. In  all  of these  countries,  the  well-to-do  pay for  the  "best"
9Due  to  the  initial  amount  of  opposition  to  the  Medicare  health  insurance
program  for  the  elderly  by physicians  and  the  American  Medical  Association,
and  by the  American  Hospital  Association,  there  was a great  deal  of
apprehension  on the  part of the  U.S.  Department  of  Health,  Education  and
Welfare  on  July 1, 1966,  when the  program  went into  effect. Officials  in the
Department  were afraid  that  physicians  and  hospitals  would  refuse  to treat  the
elderly  under  the  new insurance  program. Because  physicians  and  hospitals
quickly  realized  how  generous  Medicare  payments  were,  given  the  manner  in
which  reimbursement  was  done,  they  quickly  adjusted  to it.  In  effect,  they
bore  no financlal  risk in  the  program.22
health  care  in the  private  sector,  either  out  of their  own  pockets  or through
insurance  policies  that  usually  come  from  foreign  sources,  such  as the  French
Prevoyance  Sociale. The large  majority  of the  population  that  is  poor  relies
upon the  MOH  budget  as an implicit  or informal  form  of  national  health
insurance,  or  upon traditional  healers  for  whose  care  they  must  pay  out-of-
pocket. Because  MOH  per  capita  budgetary  expenditures  are  relatively  low  in
the  geographical  areas  where  the  poor live  or for  the  kinds  of health  care
facility  that  the  poor  use,  the  poor  do not  much  benefit  from  these  informal
national  health  insurance  systems. Indeed,  fragmentary  evidence  indicates
that  the  poor  spend  a relatively  large  percentage  of their  annual  income  on
traditional  healers  and  on drugs  when they  are  available  (do  Ferranti,  1985).
The  data  and  analysis  in this  paper  seem  to indicate  that  the  greatest
beneficiaries,  as a class,  of the  health  insurance  that  currently  exists  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa  are  the  relatively  small  middle-ciass.  When they  are
employed  in  the  private  sector,  their  employers  either  provide  health  care
directly  or on contract,  which  means,  in effect,  that  they  are  insured. When
they  are  employed  by  the  government,  they  usually  enjoy  preferential  treatment
under  both  informal  forms  of  national  health  insurance  and  formal  forms  of
health  insurance.  This  finding  is  really  not  surprising,  in  view  of  the  fact
that  in richer  countries,  such  as in  North  America  and  in  Western  Europe,  the
middle  and  upper  classes  enjoy  greater  Zinancial  and  geographic  access  to
health  care,  via  health  insurance,  even  national  health  insurance"'.  Be that
as it  may, it seems  safe  to conclude  that  the  development  of health  insurance
10For  example,  in Sweden,  where  income  is  more  equally  distributed  than
in  most  countries  and  where  there  is  a  well-funded  national  health  insurance,
the  Swedish  government  has a great  deal  of difficulty  in finding  physicians  to
serve  in the  rural  areas  of the  north.23
to  date in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  not  promoted  greater  equity  in the  access  to
health.  services  by the  poor,  nor  has it  permitted  greater  access.
When one  evamines  the  efficiency  aspects  of the  health  insurance  that  is
in  place  in  the  Sub-Sahara,  it  must  be concluded  that  the  forms  of  health
insurance  that  have  been adopted  do not  encourage  efficiency  for  the  most
part. On the  consumption  side,  many  kinds  of insurance  d.o  not  have
deductibles  and  coinsurance,  and  the  most  frequent  complaint  is that  employees
and  their  families  abuse  the  access  to  health  care  that  they  have.  In
Zimbabwe,  where  private  insurance  has  grown  rapidly  since  independence,  the
model  that  has  been apparently  used is the  one  that  existed  in the  U.S. in the
1960s  and 1970s,  where  the  purchase  of health  insurance  is  heavily  subsidized
by the  tax  system,  where  all  kinds  of medical  risk  are  covered,  ranging  from
hospital  care to  dental  and  eyeglass  care,  and  where  the  insuree  has  no
disincentive  to  use  health  care,  even for  the  most frivolous  purposes.
Analysis  of this  model  has shown  its  deleterious  effects  upon government
policy  objectives  of slowing  the  growth  of excessive  health-care  expenditures
(Pauly,  1986). On the  production  side,  we now  understand  the  perverse
incentive  effects  that  open-ended,  cost-based  retrospective  insutance  payments
can  have on the  providers  of health  care. There  is  no incentive  to  be
efficient,  and  medical  costs  escalate. In  one  way or another,  all  of the
health  insurance  arrangements  studied  in  this  paper  pay the  provider  in that
manner.
Reform  of many  of these  health  insurance  arrangements  will not  be an  easy
task,  simply  because  the  redistribution  of income  is  politically  difficult.
In  countries  where  there  is implicit  national  health  insurance,  greater  equity
for  the  poor requires  that  a larger  percentage  of the  MOH  budget  be directed24
toward  the  poor.  One  obvious  way  of  having  some  of the  resources  to  pursue
such  a policy  would  be to  eliminate  any  favorable  treatment  that  government
employees  receive  in the  health-care  system. Similarly,  more  MOH  resources
could  be freed  in  all  of these  countries,  if there  were  more  private  health
insurance  available  to those  who  could  afford  to  pay for  it 11. Governments
must  carefully  examine  the  regulator.y  and incentive  atmosphere  to  make  sure
that they  are  not  inhibiting  the  development  of  private  health  insurance.
Nevertheless,  governments  must also  be careful  that  the  kinds  of private
health  insurance  that  do develop  are  designed  to foster  efficiency  in  the
production  and  consumption  of  health  care.  The  empirical  research  literature
indicates  that  prepaid  capitated  health  insurance  fosters  efficiency  on the
production  side,  and  that  deductibles  and  coinsurance  have similar  effects  on
the  consumption  side.
1 It could  be argued  that  more  private  health  insurance  would  increase
the  demand  for  health  care  on the  part  of the  well-to-do  who could  afford  the
health  insurance,  and  thus  make  the  distribution  of access  to  health  care  even
more inequitable.  This  result  need  not  necessarily  follow. First  of all,  if
the  private  health  insurance  is  well-designed  (such  as  being  capitated,  and/or
only  catastrophic),  then  the  demand  for  health  care  by the  well-to-do  need  not
necessarily  increase. Secondly,  even  if the  health  insurance  is  not  well-
designed,  the  existence  of the  health  insurance  should  bring  forth  a private
health-care  supply-side  response,  which,  if the  MOH  budget  is  not  cut  back,
should  increase  total  national  resources  going  to  health  care.  Finally,  if
the  well-to-do  no longer  use  MOH facilities,  or use them  less  than  in  the
past,  the  MOH  can  spend  more  per  capita  on the  poor.  Therefore,  depending
upon the  design  of the  private  health  insurance  and/or  the  private  health-care
supply  response,  the  poor  may  actually  capture  a greater  share  of total  and/or
government  health-care  resources  than  they  did  in the  past.25
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Table  1
TyDology  of the  Forms  of "Health  Insurance"  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
I.  Government:  Mandated  or  Voluntary
A. Free  health  care for  all  citizens  (Tanzania)'.
B. Free  health  care for  the  poor,  and  cost  re:overy  for
those  who can  afford  to  pay (Ghana).
C. Social  Security,  or National  Health  Insurance  (Senegal) 2.
D. Government  employees  health  insurance  fund (Sudan).
E. Discount  for  government  employees  (Ethiopia).
F. Other  public  insurance  (Kenya).
G.  Mandated  employer  coverage  of emplovees,  either  in
directly  providing  health  care,  or contracting  for  it
(Zaire).
II.  Private  Sect.r:  Voluntary
A.  Private  insurance  policies  bought  from  insurance  companies
(Zimbabwe).
B.  Voluntary  (self-insuring)  risk  pools (Rwanda).
C. Employer  provided,  medical  care  directly  in  clinics
(Zambia),  or through  contract  (Nigeria).
'Countries  in  brackets  are  examples  of  where  this  form  of
"insurance"  exists.
2Senegal  has Social  Security  (the  Prevoyance  Sociale);  no country
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  presently  has  National  Health  Insurance
(NHI),  as it  exists,  say,  in  Great  Britain,  although  forms  of
NHI that  would  cover  fairly  large  segments  of the  formalized
work force  are  under  various  phases  of discussion  in  Ghana,
Nigeria  and  Zimbabwe.28




Size  Pomulatfon  Covered  by  (Including
(Millions)  Social  Other  Public  Private  Family
Country  Year  (mid-1986)  Security  Insurance  Insurance  Totalt*  Mefners)
Burkina  Faso  1981  6.7  Caisse









but  no  number
of  goverroent
employees  is




Burun.di  1986  4.9  070,  .070  1.4X
(1986)
Cameroon  1984  9.3  b
(1982)
Cote  d'Ivoire  1985  10.2  Data  not  available  on  nuWbers  of
(1985)  people insured,  but  a  smell  private
health  Insurance.
Ethiopia  19e  43.5  c  d  060  060  .001X
Ghna  1967  13.2  -
Guinea  1985  6.1  Governrent esployees are exempt
(1985)  frm  hospital  adission  charges.29




Size  Poculation  Covered by  (IncLuding
CMOitions)  Social  Other  Public  Private  Family
Countrv  Year  (mid-1986)  Securitv  Insurance  Insurance  Total*  Mefbers)
Kenya  1985  21.2  2.1  .251'  .0cC  2 .4 h  11.4%
Lesotho  1986  1.6  No insurance  because of  (s)  lar§e
migratory  labor  force  to  South  Africa
where  eWployers  ususily  provide  health
care,  and  (b)  enterprise  coverage  of
local  workers with  heaith  care  provided.
Iadaacor  1965  10.3  App rently  no  forml  insurance.
(1985)
Naald  1985  7.2
Kali  1986  7.6  .250  200J  - 250k  3.3%
Mozbique  1986  14.2 
Nigr  1964  6.1  --  -
Nigeria  1986  103.1  1  .426  .426  .04%
Senegl  1967  6.8  - --
Sudan  194  22.6  a










Size  Pooulation  Covered  by  (including
(Milions)  Social  Other  Public  Private  Family
Countrv  Year  (mid-1986) Security  Insurrnc _  Insurance  Total**  Neffbers)
Tanzania  1987  23.0  --  - -
Ugnda  1987  15.2  --  --
Zaire  1966  32.2  -
Zanbia  1961  5.6  .342  --  .342  6.1X
(1960)
Ziababie  1967  8.7  .-  400,200  400.200  4.6X°
'The  sources for  the  Information  containfd  In  Tables 2,  3,  and  4 are given  for  each  country  as  the
last  entry  for  each  country  heading,  in  Table  4.
**Am  explained  In  the  txt,  in  saw countries  (2  L  Zeire)  private  copanies  my  be required  to  furnish
health  care  or  pay  for  health  care  for  thair  employes.  At  som level  of  abstraction,  this  my  be
considered  to  be Ohealth  insurance.  Here, for  purpoms of  cornistency  of  treatment,  "health  Insurance"
eans forml  health  insurance,  where contributions  (ether  vowuntary or  by  law)  are placed  into  an
insuranmc pool,  nd then withdraew to  pay medical bills.  What  the  law in  Zaire  does,  in  effect,  ie
force  employers  to  self  insure  for  its  eloyees' health  care.  Because  of  space  limitations  in  the
Tables,  nu  bers of  people are always  given  in  the milions.  Thus,  for  exaeple,  the  total  population
Burundi  is  4.9  million,  and the  total  ni  'r  of  people insured  is  .070  million  (or  70,000).
a mututlle  de  La Fonctfon  Pthliquw.  3X  of  salary  paid by employee  and  4.5X paid  by goverrmnt.  Covers
goverrmnt  ployees and their  faillies.
b Report (see aources)  ha  an entry  for Uationsl  Social  Inswrance  Furd,  data  "not  available".
c  Socalt  Security  and Pen  ion  Furd not  inrolved  In hse1th care--  long range plan  to  adopt  ILO guidelines
for  health  Insurnoe  In  Social  Security  plan.
d  Coverr_not  *ptoyee  receive  502 discowit  at  Goverr-ant  facilities.
Coverrurnt  has been studying  the possibility  of  National  Health insurence (NH!)  (mandated  contributory)
since  1985.
f  Equnvalent to  more than half  the urban population  (NHIF-Nationtl  Hospital  Insurance Fund).31
Pubtlic  service  aployeas  entitled  to  private  medical  care  as a  fringe  benefit.  Coverage  is  funded
through  MMt  bt et.  Cost  to  WM  budget  was  Ksh  34.7  m  t  t  ion  in  1985-b66  or  2.2X  of  to_ta  MON  recurrent
expnditure.
h  Does  not  include  workers  in  private  sector  Wio  receive  medical  care  from  employer  or  have  employer
psy  for  medical  care directly:  see  Table  3.
± Pubtic  fee  schedule distinguishes  between those with  nd  without  insurnce,  but  no  information  on
health  insurwnce  available.
J  Each  goverreant  ministry  is  expected to  pay 80X  of  health  care  costs for  its  employee.
k  Social  Security  and Other Public  Insurance are not  dditive  because  tlic  enployees belong to  both.
I  Goverrwent  etloyee  end their  fi_ilies  receive  free  goverrment health  care;  but  because  cost
recovery  is  so low,  mot of  the  rest  of  the  population  also receives  free  health  care.
m Sanegal has a Social  Security  System, the  Institutione  de Prevoyance  Maladie (IPI4).  No  data  are
avoilable  on the  rLber  of  nmbers.  Every fire  with  100 or  ore eplotyees  is  required  to  form an
InstitutionZ  that  will  pay most of  the  costs of  outpatient  m*dical  care and phar_ceuticals  w*,
genrally,  all  of  the  costs  of  hospitalization,  including  deliveries  of  children.  Firm  with  less
then  100 eloyees  can join  together  to  form en "Institution.  The actuarial  construction  violates
most insurence  principles,  because  it  ignores  the  law of  large  mmbers,  which protects  againet
adverse selection  (see Vogel,  198).
G  Covernv  nt  e  ployees  receive  smtll  monthly dedution  from paycheck (1$  for  Mregulara  employees)
in  return  for  free  hoalth  care at  goverraent facilities.
Doe  not  include  workers  In  industry,  mines,  nd commercial farm;  see  Table 3.Table 3:  Contribution  of  Health  Insurance to  Hea(th Firace
Recurrent  Health Exoernditure. by Source^
PLbiIC  Private  Share of  Out- Share of  Private  Share of  Forml
NON  Social  Security  Other  Pubtic  0ut-of-  Private  other  of-Pocket  in  Insurace  in  Pulic  insurance
Comatrv  Year  Currenc  u  S  udoet  ludoet  Pocket  Insurnce  Private  Total  Total  Total  In Total
lurkin8  Faso  1961  FCFA  3.06  203'  3,607b  2,35 2C  92U4  25.4S  --  0.220S
(  s)  t  only  avaltable  for  goverrmnt  sqloyees.
binctudes:  (I)  Other Ninistries,  1,068; (II)  Foreign Aid,  2,349;
(Mii)  tocal  goverrmnt,  190.
Clcluis:  (1)  Dru  purcha.  2.298;  (ii)  Paymnt of  hospital  fets,  54.
5luwi  1966  Flu  1  27  489b  1,070 6 62ad  2.984  21.0X  16.4S
(millios)
aIncludes:  Ci)  NON  1,077;  (Mi)  NOE  181; (Mii)  NSA  9.
binclujs:  (1)  Nutuelle  de la  Fonctfon Publiqu,  476; and
(if)  ocial  security,  13.
CForeign aid.
iri  l  ud  aamissim  (210 Flu).  which are almost totally  financd  by
out-of-pocket  (210 Flu  of  215 FBu).
C_nroon  1963  FCFA  22,140  --  331a  --  --  6,100b 28,571
(millions)  *Foreign assistance  for  recurrent  costs.  W
bio informtion  on private  sector  available  for  Ca_roon,  except for
the IOOs that  snt  the  6,100 million.
Cote dlIvoire  1965  FCFA  29,085  300a  b  39 58 5c  562  69.532  569X  .0811  043U
(millions)
*CNIPS  (Caisse lationale  de Prevoyance  Sociele).
%sutu lle  Gwwrale de Fontiomnaire  and  contained  in NU budget.
cOf this  xmont,  32,641 for  drugs.
Ethiopia  1986  BIRR  79 0 '  --  20.0  196.5  0.6  5.7  301.8  65.01  .021  --
(mllions)
Govern,nt  eeployees  receive 50  discount  at Goverrtent  facllities.
Ghab  1987  Cedi  5.5  --  --  11.0  - 2.5  19.0  57.9X  --  --
(billions)
iON erployees  and  trainees receive  all  care free  and 40S  of all  drug
Issued  at  a  smple  of  hospitals  studied  In  1988.Tabte  3 cont.
Recurrent Nealth Exsenditure,  by Source
Public  Private  Share of  Out- Share  of  Private  Share  of  Formt
NMN  Sccial  Security  Other Pubtlic  Out-of-  Private  Other  of-Pocket In  Inurance  In  Pubtlic Insurwmce
Countrv  Year  Currenc  MdAt  *udbet  udoet  Pocket  Insurance  Private  Total  Total  Total  in  Total
Quine  1963  Sylis  511,820  --  35.000  236,000  --  --  789,240  29.9%  --  --
(thound.)
Kenya  1964  Kenyan 1 232.2  109.0'  227 3b  1,175.6  35.3  96.6'  2,876  40.9%  1.23%  3.8S
Shilitna
(.11ll11mw)
%NIF--  hational  Hospital  Insurance  Fund.
Includs:  (1)  Appropriation  In  Aid to  NON,  3.7;  (ii)  NH.icipalities,  152.6;
(lii)  International  Donations, 71.0.
lnctudes:  (i)  Nissians  29.3;  (ii)  Other M",  13.4;  (Cii)  Private  coqnies,  53.9.
Lesotho  1966  Maloti  20,936  - 3.122  10n726  432  26.519 61737  17.4%  .070%  --
(thousands)
'Includes:  (i)  foreign  Industry,  20.460;  (ii)  Foreign  private  Aid,  1,174;
Ciil)  Local  Votuntary  Bodies, 1.024;  liv)  Missions,  3,861.
'-'4
Madagascar  1985  FMG  13,693  8,051a  13,921  4, 753b 40.418  34.4%  LA
(miltions)
aIncludes:  ti)  Other  ministries,  3,599;  (il)  foreign  aid,  4,452.
bincludes:  (I)  Collectivities,  399;  (ii) WOs.  934;  (Iii)  Private  enterprie,  3,420.
Naltae  1986  m lawl  36,753  -8  860  3,578b  --  --  48931  7.3%
Kuacha(K)
alncludes:  i)  Value  of  drugs  in  foreign  assistance,  6,000;
(bi)  Foreign  medical  personnel  in  technical  assistance 2,600.
bincludes:  Ci Fees  at  MON  facilities,  1,048;
(iI)  Fees  at  PHAM  facilities,  2.530  Cestimted).
Mali  1986  FCFA  4,025  3840  64 0b  13,036  --  --  18.081  72.1%  --  2.1
(millions)
'About  50%  of  these  funds  go  for  administrative  epenses.
bincludes:  (i)  Other  Ninistries,  96; Mi)  Foreign  aid,  542.Tadle 3 cant.
R current  Health Exoendlture.  Iv  Sourcee
Publk  C  Private  Share of  Out- Share of  Private  Share of  Formol NON  Social  Security  Other Public  Out-of-  Private  Other  of-Packet  in  Inuronce  in  Public  Insurance Countrv  Year  Currency  t  Sudeet  udoet  Pocket  Inwrance  Private  Total  Total  Total  ln  Total
Mozabique  19l5  ueticat  --  - MA  S  .- - 754.7  7.4  --  -- ACC0rdi,n to  ource, donor contributions  have been substntial
in  recant  yeors;  amount not  knom.
ls  t  recovery revnu  s.  In  1967. in  the  face of  growi,n  fin  ncial
difficulties,  *  ,  nvmore  coq  O  rhensive  cost  recovery schem wes
Introduced,  consistins  of  tl)  a flet  one-time fee  for  outpetient
cmnwultations  (11)  p ynent  for  outpatint  drugs, w*  (Mii)  a daily
Inpatient  fee in urban hoapitals.
Niger  1964  FICA  4,455  - 4.0450  300I  *-  --  11,500  35.2X
*Includes:  (f)  Externl  assistance,  2,500;  Cii)  Niniatiy  of  Higher Education, 350;
(Off)  Ninistry  of  Finance  1,090 (of  uhich O1N0  for  foreign  evacuations);
(iv)  Others,  105.
binclucjs:  (i)  Druss. 2,800;  fii)  Other.  200.
igeria  1965  Nair&  177.2  --  592.1  696 % 9b  74 9C  15431  45.3  LA (mill  ions)
aincludes:  (1)  State expenditures.  436.6;  (1i)  Local government  authorities,  155.5.
bstimsted  fr  Over and  Denton (1968),  pare.  5.14 end  Table 5.3;
103.1 x  16 x 42.37 (population  x 11t1  x average eenditure).
cssua  that  only  the  respondents to  NU0  qustiommare  provide  care;
s  OCrnts*  colum  In  Table 3.
Senegal  1961  FCFA  6.890.4  175.7  9,479.9  6,919.9b  4 15 6 *C  --  27,622.4  25.1X  15.0X  .061 (il  li  fons)
CIncludes:  (1)  Special budget for  civil  servants,  1,201.2;
(11) External  contributors.  4,530.9;
(ifi)  Paratatal  expenditures.  1,52S.1;
(iv)  Local  governent  expenditure,  1,1791.
bincludes:  (i)  Coummity participation,  425.0;  (1i)  leport  of  pharoceuticals,  6,494.9.
Cincludes:  (I)  Hopital  Principal,  2.294.0;  (ii)  Private  doctors,  562.8;
(111) Private  clnics,  1.300.0.Table  3  cont,
Recurrent Health  Expenditure,  by  Source'
"Pilc  Private  Share of  Out- Share of  Private  Share of  For_l
MN  Social  Security  other  Public  Out-of-  Private  Other  of-Pocket  In  Insuranco In  Pubile  Insurance
Cointrv  Year  Currencjmt  Budoet  Audett  Pocket  Private  Total  Total  Total  in  Total
tudan  1966  LS  MA 1 P 0 -49  7 ' 5c  617.6  77U6X  -
(mllIa)
aIncl, u_ LS5.9 from deductions from monthly pay of  goverrment  eloytcs.
b^W  re  ;qof  high  nd tow estim-te.
5Expenditure  by private  firms.
"S.9/617.6  where 5.9  is  deducted from govern,ent  *eployes--  - see
Swaziland  1984  E  9.745  --  3,500  3.600  1.200  3,l00b  21.145  17.0X  57s-
(thoumnde)
aInctudes:  MI)  Other ministries,  600;  (Ci)  Foreign essistane,  2,900.
bincludes:  (i)  Misions,  00;  (1) Voluntery  organizatiors,  300;
(III)  Industry  *nd  mines.  2.000.
Twnzanis  1967  Tanzania  1,838  --  3,376  b  5  214
Shilling
(millions)
*Includes:  (i)  Ministry  of  Local  Goverrment  nd  Cooperation,  1,358;  LA
Ci) Office  of  the  Prime  Minister,  1,112;  'n
(iii)  Donations  of  Drugs  by  Danida,  770;
(iv)  District  and  Urban  Do  eop  emnt  Levy,  136.
bAll  health  care  at  governuent  focilities  is  officially  free.  Users  of
some  mission  facilities  pay  government-regulated  fees.  Mny of  the
fees are  for  the drugs  donated  by Danids, but  only  at mission facilities.
The expwnditure aouts are uninown.
Uganda  1988  Ugonda  62417  *-  43,090  290.000  --  14,861b 4 10 368c  7  - --
Shilling
(millions)
*Includes:  (i)  Mulago  Hospital  and Complex,  35,093;
(ii)  Ministry  of  Local Government.  7,997.
C3old.  Shillings.Table 3 cont,
Recurrent Heatth Exzeriditure.  by Souwce*
Puhtc  Private  Share of  Out- Share of  Private  Share of  ForLt
MO  Soclot  Security  Other  Pubtic  Out-of-  Private  Other  of-Pocket  In  Irsuracme In  Pbtilc  Inumrnce trv  Year  CArrency  -L-et  Sudoet  Sudoet  Pocket  Insurnce  Private  Total  Total  Total  in  Total
Zaire  1986  USS  t  O  O  41.0  154b  205.0  20.0X
(mill law)
Alao covers  health  care of  goverrsnt  qplaoees.
biecluddal:  (I)  Privte-sector  firm.  14.O;
(II)  Donrs  gn  160s, seprrate  breakdowi not  availoble,  10.0.
Zmbia  1981  Kuwaha  .s9  *-  30 .9a  199  4.5  128.2  15.5X  --  24.1S (millions)
Z2ian  Cornolidated Coper  Nines  (ZCCN), the state mining corporation.
Zilabwe  1987  ZS  310.t8  -l  99 32b  63.90  105.00  5781c  636.21  10.04X  16.51X  -- (mi  ll ions)
aCentrdl  Goverrment.
bInludos:  (i)  N.icip.lities,  25.00;  (ii)  Foreign A"istsnce  74.32.
CIncludes:  (i)  Church  missions,  2.56;  (ii)  Industries,  NInrw, Comerciat  Farm.  50.75;  w
(111) Voluntary  Orafniztions,  4.50.
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